Volume 21
Issue 2 Spring 1981
Spring 1981

Tribal Severance Taxes - Outside the Purview of the Commerce
Clause
Susan Tixier

Recommended Citation
Susan Tixier, Tribal Severance Taxes - Outside the Purview of the Commerce Clause, 21 Nat. Resources J.
405 (1981).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol21/iss2/12

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

TRIBAL SEVERANCE TAXES-OUTSIDE THE
PURVIEW OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEVERANCE TAXES:
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held severance taxes levied by
Indian tribal governments cannot be examined in light of commerce
clause principles because the act of severance precedes commerce,
Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980),
cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980) (No. 80-11).

Severance taxation is being touted as a means of conservation of
non-renewable resources as well as a source of revenue for the taxing
entity whose resources are being irreplaceably depleted. 1 Energy production companies, however, are being asked to pay up to 30 percent
of value in severance taxes2 and the question of how much industry
and, eventually, consumers should pay for removal of the resource

before interstate commerce suffers an unconstitutional impediment
is presently being asked of the United States Supreme Court.'
The issues surrounding state taxation of resource extraction are
further complicated by the assertion of taxing power by Indian tribes
located in resource-rich states. In Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe,'

the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld
tribal power to tax resource extraction on the reservation,' and
brushed aside a commerce clause attack against the tribal tax. 6 Supreme Court review has been granted and it may be that Indian sov-

ereignty questions will predominate ultimate high court review.7
1. See generally Browde & Dumars, State Taxation of NaturalResources Extraction and
the Commerce Cause: Federalism'sModern Frontier,60 OR. L REV. 7 (1980); Comment,
Constitutional Limitations on State Severance Taxes, 20 NAT. RES. J. 886 (1980); Comment, An Outline for Development of Cost-Based State Severance Taxes, 20 NAT. RES. J.
915 (1980).
2. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 615 P.2d 847 (Mont. 1980), prob. juris.
noted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3428 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1980) (No. 80-581).
3. See id.
4. 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cit. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980)
(No. 80-11). While not formally consolidated, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 615
P.2d 847 (Mont. 1980), prob. juris. noted, 49 U.S.LW. 3428 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1980) (No. 80581), andMerrionhave been set together for oral argument, 49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (1980).
5. 617 F.2dat 549.
6. Id. at 546.
7. The Indian sovereignty questions, although of great importance, are not treated
herein. This note seeks only to focus on the commerce clause questions raised by the case.
For a pre-Merrion discussion of tribal powers to tax in this field, see Comment, Tribal Power
to Tax Non-Indian Mineral Lessees, 19 NAT. RES. J. 969 (1979).
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Nonetheless, the potential for dual state-tribe taxation, should tribal
authority pass muster, raises novel commerce clause questions, the
analysis of which may be uniquely unaided by traditional commerce
clause standards.
In 1976, the Tribal Council of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe adopted
an ordinance8 imposing a tax on the severance of "any oil and
natural gas severed, saved and removed from Tribal lands." 9 Two
groups of energy resource production companies with leases on the
reservation' 0 brought suit in the United States District Court for the
District of New Mexico seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
against the collection of the tax.' 1 They alleged inter alia1 2 that the
8. The ordinance provides in pertinent part:
OIL AND GAS SEVERANCE TAX
Ordinance No. 77-0-02
as amended by Ordinance No. 77-0-195
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED: That effective on the date
set forth hereinafter, a severance tax is imposed on any oil and natural gas severed, saved and removed from Tribal lands, as follows:
1. Due Date of Tax
Such taxes shall become due at the time of severance and payable
monthly as herein provided.
2. Rate of Tax-Gas
The severance tax set forth herein shall be at the rate of $.05 per million BTU of gas produced on the Jicarilla Apache Reservation and sold off
or transported off the Reservation.
3. Rate of Tax-Oil
The severance tax set forth herein shall be at the rate of $.29 per barrel
of crude oil or condensate as measured under the terms of this Ordinance,
which is produced on the Jicarilla Apache Reservation and sold or transported off the Reservation.
4. Exemption
Royalty gas, oil or condensate taken by the Tribe in kind and used by
the Tribe shall be exempt from taxation.
9. Id.
10. The production companies are engaged in extracting oil and gas from the Tribe's reservation lands under various leases issued by the Tribal Council and approved by the Secretary of Interior. Section 4 of the 1938 Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. § 396d (1976), provides that
oil and gas leases issued on restricted Indian land shall be subject to rules and regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Interior. See 25 CFR Part 161 (1980); 30 CFR Part 221
(1980).
11. More than a dozen companies brought an initial action
against the tribe. Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 77-292P (D.N.M., filed May 23, 1977). An independent action
was filed by Amoco Production Co. and Marathon Oil Co. which alleged virtually identical
claims against the tax. Amoco Production Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 77-343P
(D.N.M., filed June 14, 1977). The cases were, however, consolidated in the district court
for trial.
12. The companies also claimed that imposition of the tax deprived them of due process
and equal protection. Furthermore, they claimed that the Secretary of Interior violated the
law by approving the leases. Primarily, the companies asserted that the tribe had no power
to tax non-Indians on their reservation, and that even if they had general power to tax, federal law had preempted their power to impose this particular tax by granting the exclusive
power to the states. See Complaint at 5-12, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, No. 77-292P
(D.N.M., filed May 23, 1977).
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imposition of the tax violated the commerce clause' 3 of the United
States Constitution.
The district court consolidated the cases for trial,1 4 found for the
companies, and invalidated the tax. On the commerce clause question, the district court held that the tax discriminated against and
constituted a multiple burden on interstate commerce in violation of
the Constitution.' s The tribe, permanently enjoined from enforcing
the ordinance, appealed.
After briefing and oral argument in the court of appeals, but prior
to decision, the assigned panel 6 sua sponte set the case for rehearing,
en banc,' ' and the full court of appeals reversed the district court.' 8
The court held inter alia' 9 that since the tax was levied on the extraction of minerals from tribal soil, an activity which precedes entry
to interstate commerce, 2" the tax did not violate the commerce
clause. 2 ' This holding rendered commerce clause analysis unnecessary
13. U.S. CONST. art. 1, 8, cl. 3: "The Congress shall have power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes."
14. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 539 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. granted,
49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980) (No. 80-11).
15. The district court also held that: (1) the tribe did not have sovereign or congressionally granted power to tax, and (2) 25 U.S.C. § 398(c) (1976) conferred exclusive power to
tax the act of severance in the states.
16. The initial panel was composed of Chief Judge Seth and Circuit Judges McKay and
Holloway. In the ultimate tenth circuit decision, only Judge Holloway of that original panel
joined the majority opinion. Judge McKay concurred in the result but added his view of Indian sovereignty in a concurring opinion. See 617 F.2d at 549. The Chief Judge dissented on
the Indian sovereignty issue. See 617 F.2d at 551. Judge Barrett also wrote a dissenting
opinion. See 617 F.2d at 556.
17. Generally such en banc action will not be taken unless the proceeding involves a
question of exceptional importance. The importance and novelty of the issues presented in
Merrion might have necessitated en banc consideration even if the initial panel had not been
divided. See Fed. R. App. P. 35(a).
18. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49
U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980) (No. 80-11).
19. The court also held that the Tribe had an inherent right to enact the tax, id. at 544,
and that 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1976) did not evidence congressional intent "to so occupy the
field of regulating leasing of tribal property ... that the Tribes could not impose additional
burdens ... through exercise of the power of taxation." 617 F.2d at 549.
Chief Judge Seth, in dissent, disagreed. Acknowledging the self-determination of the
Tribe, he described their status under the Enabling Act for the State of New Mexico, Act of
June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557, as no more than "landowners or possible landowners"
id. at 552, and concluded that "the combination of land ownership and self-determination
•.. does not create a governmental agency or entity recognized or contemplated by the
Constitutions of the United States or of New Mexico." Id. at 553.
20. The court relied on well entrenched authority that local activities such as manufacturing, production and severance precedes commerce and therefore do not trigger commerce
clause consideration. See, e.g., Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Inc. v. Alabama, 393 U.S. 537
(1969); Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S.
284 (1927); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923).
21. Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923), and Hope Natural Gas Co. v.
Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927), were, together with Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245
(1922), the first expressions of the severance-precedes-commerce doctrine. It has been sug-
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to the decision.2 2 Responding to the reasoning of the district court,
however, the court of appeals proceeded in dicta to analyze the tax
under traditional commerce clause standards.
First, the court considered whether the Jicarilla tax discriminates
against interstate commerce. 2 3 The crux of this discrimination argugested, however, that the underpinnings of the "Heisler Trilogy" have been substantially
eroded by modern economic developments and the growth of modern commerce clause
jurisprudence:
The Court enunciated the Heisler principle at a time when all or nothing
prevailed. A tax on commerce itself was prohibited by the commerce clause interpretation of the day, so if the Court was to allow states to tax certain activities, it had to define those activities as "out of" commerce. The Heisler Court
announced its severance-precedes-commerce rule because of its overriding concern that a decision invalidating Pennsylvania's coal severance tax could apply
to defeat not only all severance taxes but all kinds of necessary state business
taxes. It also feared that to define mining as "in" commerce would "nationalize and withdraw from state jurisdiction" not just coal but all the native products of each state.
Although the post-Heisler Court occasionally indicated that the status of
being "in" commerce should not prevent the states from exacting some fair
measure of taxation, it was not until Complete Auto that the Court firmly held
that interstate commerce did indeed have to pay its own way. Complete Auto
removes the need for the severance-precedes-commerce test of the Heisler trilogy because it allows state taxes to stand even when they attach to business
activities inextricably linked with interstate commerce. Thus, it shows the way
to apply the commerce clause to severance taxation while still allowing important state taxes to stand. By upholding only nondiscriminatory, fairly apportioned taxes that have some nexus with the state and are "fairly related to the
services provided by the state," the Complete Auto test obviates the Heisler
Court's chief concern. States can tax interstate commerce, but they must do
so fairly.
Complete Auto also removes the other policy reason for Heisler. Its fourpronged test can be read to protect local control and taxation of "the fruits of
California and the South, the wheat of the West and its meats, the cotton of
the South, and shoes of Massachusetts and the woolen industries of other
States" just as surely as Heisler but without the rigid formalism that requires
the Court to say that while certain activities are closely linked with commerce,
they are not "in" commerce.
Browde & Dumars, supra note 1, at 42-43 (footnotes omitted).
22. "[I] t is settled that an occupation or privilege tax on the mining or severing of
natural resources, although closely connected with interstate commerce, is a local activity
properly subject to local taxation." 617 F.2d at 545.
23. Discrimination occurs, generally, when there is "a direct commercial advantage to
local business." Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977).
"Local" has traditionally meant within the state. This case defines "local" by reservation
line rather than state line, thereby implicating the "Indian Commerce" phrase of the commerce clause. It has been recognized that the Indian commerce clause may have a "role to
play in preventing undue discrimination against, or burdens, on, Indian Commerce." Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 100 S. Ct. 2069 (1980).
While recognizing that "no Court has analyzed how the tribes are limited in their taxing
power by the Indian Commerce Clause," the Merrion court concluded: "[T] he standards to
be used in applying that clause is whether a tribe's tax legislation infringes upon the national
interest in maintaining the flow of interstate trade ... measured by traditional [commerce
clause] analyses." 617 F.2d at 545.
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ment is the language of the ordinance that the tax is levied only
against natural gas, crude oil, or condensate which is produced on the
reservation and sold or transported off the reservation. 2 4 The court
of appeals rejected the lower court conclusion that the local preference of non-taxation given to "royalty gas, oil and condensate taken
by the Tribe in-kind, and used by the Tribe" amounts to a commercial advantage to local business. Although the court recognized that
no on-reservation production business exists,2 it based its conclusion on the royalty nature of the untaxed products: "[si ubjecting
royalty products the tribe would receive to its own tax would be a
fruitless and wasteful act."'2 6 Given the court's rationale, if there
were on-reservation refining capacity, sale of royalty oil to the onreservation producer would not implicate the commerce clause, even
though, as Judge Barrett pointed out in dissent, "[tIhe in-state business would not be assessed the Tribe's severance tax, while the outof-state business would. The impact would thus be an unequal, competitive footing."'2 While this argument has an air of unreality about
it, in the absence of on-reservation refining and distribution capacity,
it does properly assess the nature of royalty interests.
Traditionally, states sell all of the energy resources produced on
state lands and, therefore, apply cash royalty payments to total
products. Furthermore, if a state took in-kind royalties and set up a
state-owned system for refinement and distribution for the express
purpose of favoring its own citizens, recent case law suggests it may
do so without violating the commerce clause.2 8 When Merrion is
read in light of these recent developments, it suggests interesting
potential economic development ventures which would allow tribes

24. See note 8 supra.
25. 617 F.2d at 545.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 566 (Barrett, J., dissenting). Judge Barrett perceived a discrimination problem
in the potential for sale of royalty oil to intrastate, off-reservation producers:
In relation to the instant case, those businesses engaged in exclusive intrastate
refining, marketing and distribution of oil and gas who purchase that portion of
the oil and gas retained on the Tribe's land and thus not subject to the Tribal
Severance Tax, would enjoy a discriminatory competitive advantage over those
businesses supplying the oil and gas produced from the Reservation lands
moving in interstate commerce.
Id. (emphasis in original).
28. In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 100 S. Ct. 2271 (1980), the Supreme Court concluded that
South Dakota was operating in a proprietory capacity for the benefit of its citizens in confining the sale of state-produced cement to citizens of South Dakota. The Court held that
such activity did not implicate the commerce clause. See also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
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to capitalize on natural resource ownership in a constitutionally permissible way. 2
The court also dealt with the district court conclusion that the tax
was invalid because it constituted an impermissible "multiple burden" on commerce.' 0 The court began its analysis with the multiple
burden formulation in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue: the
"vice characteristic" of local taxes is that they are capable of being
imposed "with equal right by every state which the commerce
touches... ."I1 Noting that no state other than New Mexico can
impose such a tax, the court properly identified the multiple burden
issue arising from the "possibility, which we assume is fact, of New
Mexico levying an identical tax" 3 2 to the one levied by the tribe.
Addressing this important issue no further, the court noted that such
dual taxation raises other questions,3 3 and surprisingly concluded
that dual state-tribe taxation "does not implicate the federal interest
in maintaining the flow of interstate commerce at all. . . ."I
However, Western Live Stock,3" as well as other Supreme Court
formulations of the multiple burden problem, 3 6 make clear the
29. But see South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. LeResche, 49 U.S.L.W. 2473 (U.S.D.C.
Alaska, Jan. 1, 1981) (natural resources treated differently than manufacture of cement).
30. "Because every state has equal rights when taxing the commerce it touches, there
exists the danger that such taxes can impose cumulative burdens upon interstate transactions
which are not presented to local commerce." General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S.
436, 440 (1964). See, e.g., Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 419
U.S. 560 (1976) (tax on gross receipts from interstate sales of aerospace fasteners); J. D.
Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938) (tax on gross receipts from manufacture
and interstate sale of road machinery and equipment); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938) (tax on gross receipts from interstate sale of advertising).
31. 303 U.S. 250, 255 (1938).
32. 617 F.2d at 546.
33. "[Wlhether the state's tax interferes with the federal interest in regulating the
affairs of the Indians, a question we do not reach, and whether a Congressional grant of
authority to levy the state tax preempts tribal taxation." 617 F.2d at 546 (emphasis in original). With respect to the court's resolution of the second question, see note 19 supra.
34. 617 F.2d at 546 (emphasis added). The federal interest in maintaining the flow of
interstate commerce without burdens of unapportioned multiple taxes is found articulated
in a host of cases. See note 30 supra and note 36 infra. The difference between these cases
and Merrion is that in the former a "horizontal" duplication of taxes results from taxation
by several states on different localized events. In the latter there is a "vertical" duplication
by state and Tribe, both with the taxing power over the same event. Since Indian reservations are geographically located in states rich in energy resource minerals, if the Merrion
grant of taxing power to the Tribe is upheld, then not only are federal interests implicated,
they may in fact be seriously threatened.
35. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
36. See, e.g., Standard Steel Co. v. Washington Revenue Dep't., 419 U.S. 560, 563
(1975): "[A] vice in a tax on gross receipts of a corporation doing an interstate business is
the risk of multiple taxation...." See also Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305
U.S. 434, 439 (1939) ("Here the tax, measured by the entire volume of the interstate commerce in which appellant participates, is not apportioned to its activities within the state. If
Washington is free to exact such a tax, other states to which the commerce extends may,
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gravamen of multiple burdens is that such taxation could result in
cumulative burdens which could impede the flow of commerce in
violation of commerce clause principles unless the burden is fairly
apportioned among the taxing entities. This opinion could be rationalized in light of these earlier decisions by the theory that multiple
burden analysis is only applicable when the possibility exists for the
imposition of taxes by more than only two states, if three or more
states could levy an unapportioned tax. The logic of this court's conclusion is suspect, however, if similar taxes on commerce imposed by
the only two states which could do so would result in an invalid multiple burden.3
Furthermore, the court accepted the trial court's finding that
"eighty percent of the hydrocarbons produced on the reservation
entered interstate commerce," 3 8 but rejected the conclusion that
such a fact established impermissible discrimination against interstate
commerce. Finding the tax to be levied on the extraction activity
rather than shipment into commerce,3 ' the court fell back on its
severance-precedes-commerce analysis, which was the basis for the
commerce clause holding.
The court also noted that if the tax were indeed a tax on interstate
commerce, it would be governed by the newly articlulated standard
in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.4 I Complete Auto requires
that the tax must be (1) applied to an activity with a substantial
nexus to the taxing state; (2) fairly apportioned; (3) not discriminatory against interstate commerce; and (4) fairly related to the services provided by the state. 4 1
The court found that the first three principles of Complete Auto
were satisfied, and that with respect to "fair relationship to services,"
with equal right, lay a tax similarly measured ....
); Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe
Line Co., 303 U.S. 604, 612 (1938) (Discussing the possibility of there being a multiple burden of taxation on production of power, the Court said: "The course of interstate commerce is clogged by taxes designed or applied so as to hamper its free flow."); Adams Mfg.
Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938) ("The vice of the statute as applied.., is that the
tax includes in its measure, without apportionment, receipts derived from activities in interstate commerce; and that the exaction is of such a character that if lawful it may in substance be laid to the fullest extent by States in which the goods are sold as well as those in
which they are manufactured. Interstate commerce would thus be subjected to the risk of a
double tax burden.. . which the commerce clause forbids ... ").
37. Certainly, potential looms larger as the number of possible taxing entities increases;
however, the fact that only two taxing entities can impact on an interstate business can be
no less ominous if each has the authority to levy an unfettered tax.
38. Merrion v. Jicarila Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 545 (10th Cit. 1980), cert. granted,
49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980) (No. 80-11).
39. See notes 20 and 22 supra.
40. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
41. Id. at 279.
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there was no basis on which to hold the tax invalid because "[lI]essees
did not build a factual foundation in the record to challenge the tax
on this ground .. , 2 Significant is the court's suggestion that the
burden is on the taxpayer to demonstrate that a tax is not fairly related to services rather than on the state to justify a suspect tax.4
More importantly, now that fair relationship to services has independent significance, 4 4 its presence gives rise to the implication that
court scrutiny may legitimately focus on the amount of a given tax
in addition to the power of the taxing entity to impose the tax. 4 5
Therefore, if tribal power to tax is allowed to stand on equal footing
with state power to tax the same event, the dual taxation will raise
interesting state-tribe problems. A challenge to the total state and
tribal taxes based on fair relationship to services would require a difficult delineation of state and tribal services against which each tax
would then have to be measured. Even more interesting to contemplate is a joint state-tribal defense of the total tax based on the totality of benefits, protections and services 4 6 provided by the state and
tribe taken together.
The disposition of the commerce clause question in Merrion was
42. 617 F.2d at 545 n.4.
43. It may well be that the tax enjoys a presumption of validity which must be overcome by those challenging it. However, if the lessees produce some evidence of invalidity,
perhaps the ultimate burden of establishing fair relationship to services lies with the taxing
entity. Cf Raymond Motors Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444-45 (1978).
It must be noted that imposition of the Complete Auto standard on lessees is rather
harsh in that the trial took place prior to the Supreme Court decision enunciating the standard.
44. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
45. In the modern balancing test mandated by Complete Auto, courts must examine the
amount of, as well as the reason for, a particular tax.
Unfortunately, the Court has not yet provided an adequate standard for
measuring costs to the state and determining whether a tax is excessive in relation to those costs. Although the general "benefits" and "opportunities" language may be a sufficient basis for applying the nexus test, which requires
only minimum contacts, it is not helpful in applying the fair-relationship-toservices element of Complete Auto. The precise definition of the opportunities, benefits, and services that may be included in the fair relationship equation and how those factors must be measured and weighed will fequire further
clarification through judicial resolution of future cases.
However, if the fair-relationship-to-services requirement is ultimately defined, it likely will
be the determinative factor in future resource taxation cases. Browde & Dumars, supra note
1, at 49.
46. "A state is free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution,
if by the practical operation of a tax the state has exerted its power in relation to opportunities which it has given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it has conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized society." Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311
U.S. 435, 444 (1940) (emphasis added). This earlier formulation of appropriate state services taken from the nexus context has some applicability to "fair relationship to services."
See Browde & DuMars, supra note 1, at 46.
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based on the most traditional of standards-that the severance is a
local activity which precedes commerce and therefore falls outside
the scope of commerce clause protection.4 Should the severanceprecedes-commerce approach give way to a more flexible and less
mechanistic standard while both tribal and state taxation is allowed,
then serious and complex commerce clause questions necessarily
emerge. First, in-kind royalties coupled with tribal-based production
could prove to be a significant exception to traditional notions of
impermissible discrimination in favor of in-state, on-reservation, business. Second, traditional notions of "multiple burdens" and modes
of apportionment will prove not particularly helpful. Finally, the
evolving standard of "fair relationship to services" may ultimately
require state-tribal agreements on relative rates of tax to avoid the
constitutional invalidity of both taxes.
The real results of this case are that the Jicarilla tribe has the sovereign power to levy a severance tax and there can be no commerce
clause control of such levy. The tax the tribe has imposed, combined
with the six taxes levied by New Mexico, 48 creates a tax burden of
more than 29 percent. 4 9 The case set for hearing with Merrion involves a 30 percent state tax on the severance of coal.' 0
If this tax is allowed to stand without commerce clause scrutiny,
the next case may be concerned with a tax in excess of 30 percent.
The United States Supreme Court has never used commerce clause
standards to specifically state that a tax was unconstitutional because
it was too high. If it upholds the tenth circuit court's decision in Merrion, the court will have given tacit approval for any taxing entity to
tax up to 30 percent on any local event preceding commerce.
SUSAN TIXIER

47. 617 F.2d at 546.
48. Oil and Gas Severance Tax, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-29-1 to -22 (Repl. 1980);Oil
and Gas Conservation Tax, id. § § 7-30-1 to -26; Oil and Gas Emergency School Tax, id.
§ § 7-31-1 to -25; Oil and Gas Ad Valorem Production Tax, id. § § 7-32-1 to -27; Natural
Gas Processors Tax, id. § § 7-33-1 to -22; Oil and Gas Production Equipment Ad Valorem
Tax, id. § § 7-34-1 to -20.
49. Appellant Merrion's Petition of Writ of Certiorari at n.1, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980)
(No. 80-11).
50. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 615 P.2d 847 (Mont. 1980), prob. juris.
noted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3428 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1980) (No. 80-581).

